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Abstract
*
This paper investigates the conditions under which political framing can render
welfare restructuring more palatable. I start by asking two research questions.
First, what are the necessary (albeit perhaps insufficient) conditions that allow
leaders to successfully frame welfare reform? Second, to what extent are these
conditions evident across welfare regimes? I identify four variables that affect
leaders’ opportunities for framing social policy: (i) extant frames, (ii) actors, (iii)
institutions and (iv) policy arena. After examining four dominant types of
frames across affluent societies, I review the discursive politics surrounding The
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act as a case
where all four conditions for framing welfare retrenchment coalesced.
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Introduction
The “new politics of the welfare state” is a term coined by Pierson (1996) to
differentiate between the popular politics of welfare state expansion and the
unpopular politics of welfare state retrenchment. It is a tribute to Pierson’s
pioneering conceptualisation of welfare state politics that the “new politics”
now refers to the broader restructuring literature. Yet, with welfare state
restructuring gaining greater momentum across affluent societies since the early
1990s, it is increasingly apparent that welfare institutions are not quite so sticky
nor so unassailably popular as has been portrayed in the ‘new politics’ literature
(author, 2000). Far from being confined to a politics of blame-avoidance,
political leaders are taking a more proactive role in crafting welfare reform and,
in some notable cases, even gaining political credit for implementing harsh
initiatives. Nowhere has this been more clear than in the abolition of AFDC by
the Clinton administration and Republican-controlled Congress in the United
States and New Labour’s New Deal in Britain (King, 1999).
Yet, portraying leaders as trapped between sticky, popular institutions
and post-industrial transformations, the ‘new politics’ literature has dismissed
elite influence over institutions, ideas or public opinion. Consequently, we have
little understanding of how symbolic politics, the strategic deployment of
political discourse, and policy framing can serve as strategies of agenda control.
The mechanisms by which leaders can shape public opinion, aggregate interests
and expand leadership options under conditions of constraint remain unclear.
These issues are particularly pressing in that new (or recycled) ideas
concerning the welfare state seem to be triumphing over deeply entrenched
welfare institutions, especially in the English-speaking world (see King, 1999).
Political agendas are proving to be more than an amalgam of vested interests,
institutional habits and public opinion. Ideas and their political advocacy do not
simply serve as constraints in the welfare restructuring process, buttressing the
status quo and locking-in popular welfare institutions. They also drive the
reform process.
Assisted by the intervention of “new actors”, including policy experts,
networks and think tanks (King, 1999), leaders across affluent societies have
sought to implement increasingly adventurous welfare reforms since the early
1990s. While most pronounced in the English-speaking world, these agenda
changes are well evident in the social democratic welfare regimes of the Nordic
countries and, to a lesser extent, the catholic-conservative regimes of
continental Europe.
1 Supra-national leadership efforts from bodies such as the
International Monetary Fund and World Trade Organisation, in combinationRSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 4
with heightened global competitive pressures and post-industrial
transformations, are re-defining the range of ‘thinkable’ political ideas among
policy  elites. Despite continuing public attachment to welfare institutions,
leaders on the left and right reveal a growing scepticism towards state provision
and an increasing acceptance of market-based approaches to social problems
(see Rhodes, 1996:308).
The power of new and recycled ideas, however, in large measure
depends upon how successfully they can be diffused among pivotal electoral
constituencies. Framing and the selective application of political discourse, the
processes whereby the advantages of a policy are styled and communicated, is
one means by which leaders attempt to compensate for the disappointment and
loss of legitimacy following the attrition of popular social supports. It is
possible, of course, that where imbalances in programmatic coverage conflict
with new and emerging values, leaders may enjoy opportunities for turning
“vice into virtue” (Levy, 1999). More usually, however, leaders’ struggle
simply to transform unpalatable policies into tolerable necessities.
The politics of welfare state restructuring, in other words, is not simply
an aggregate of institutional impediments, globalisation and post-industrial
transformations. Nor is it simply a politics of “bottom-up” constraint, whereby
elected officials are beholden to a watchful and defensive public. The politics of
welfare state restructuring is also about ideas, their political advocacy and
legitimisation.
In this paper I investigate the conditions under which political framing
can render welfare restructuring more palatable. I start by asking two research
questions. First, what are the requisite conditions for framing welfare reform?
Can we specify a set of necessary (albeit perhaps insufficient) conditions that
allow leaders to frame successfully welfare reform? Second, to what extent are
these conditions evident across welfare regimes? To address these two
questions the paper is divided into four sections. Following the introduction,
section two reviews the concept of framing and identifies four variables that
condition leaders’ opportunities for framing social policy: (i) extant frames, (ii)
actors, (iii) institutions and (iv) policy arena. Section three briefly illustrates
how these four parameters vary across welfare regimes. Section four surveys
the discursive politics surrounding  The Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) as a case where all four
conditions for framing welfare retrenchment coalesced.RSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 5
The Concept of Framing
Defining the Framing Exercise
The concept of framing is predicated on the familiar assumptions of cognitive
psychology: compounding time, energy and interest constraints, individuals are
cognitively impaired and, therefore, resort to shortcuts when approaching the
political world. The aim of the framer is to exploit these weaknesses in the
hope of either reinforcing or changing the audience's choices. By specifying a
policy's benefits, linking it with popular symbols, and effectively
communicating with the audience, the framer seeks to control the process of
evaluation (Kenski, 1996; Hacker, 1996).
The principal features of the cognitive framing exercise are well
documented (see  Entman, 1993;  Chomsky and Herman, 1988). Some
definitions include an element of priming, while others emphasise the
conveyance of information. Iyengar, for example, defines framing as “subtle
alternations in the statement or presentation of judgement and choice
problems…”, whereas Just and  Cigler incorporate both communication and
interpretation processes; frames amount to “conceptual tools which media and
individuals rely on to convey, interpret and evaluate information” (cited in
Kenski, 1996:73-75).
While definitions of the  cognitive framing exercise generate  much
consensus, the literature does use the term in a second, fundamentally different
way. Rather than depicting the framing process as an active means of shaping
discourse with the aim to reinforce or convert, the concept is also used to
capture prevailing cultural perspectives,  predispositions and prejudices that
condition the way individuals, organisations and states interpret and approach
the political world (Rein and Schon, 1994). This use of the concept is vitally
important for understanding how existing frames serve as powerful defensive
mechanisms to new frames. To comprehend the conditionality of new welfare
frames they must be examined in tandem with entrenched cultural
predispositions.
2
The Impact of Framing
The cognitive framing literature often appears extravagant in its claims
regarding the power of framing (see Druckman, 1998 for a useful overview).
The general thrust of framing studies often seems to be that artful leaders can
manipulate a naive and trusting public with slim resistance so long as they
deploy a cogent set of frames. In Druckman's (1998:2-3) words, “a common
depiction of elite framing is that many citizens follow whichever frame theyRSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 6
hear most frequently and or most recently. The implication is that nearly any
elite can potentially use a frame to manipulate public opinion”. Thus, if leaders
repeat (frequently and recently) that welfare cuts are really a hidden blessing
then sooner or later the unsuspecting public is apt to see some virtue in the
retrenchment exercise.
If framing possessed such power the notion of unpopular policies would
hinge solely on leaders’ framing abilities. Leaders could exert control over both
the saliency and interpretation of any social issue. Though framing does tend to
be more effective where an issue is either distant or new, or where the listener
is ambivalent ( Druckman, 1998), none of these criteria apply to welfare
restructuring. Indeed, one of the more immediate problems with framing new
welfare initiatives is the breadth of interested parties. New frames, therefore,
must target broad sections of society not just a narrow band of immediately
injured parties.
Framing as a Conditional Variable
Like most political variables it is doubtful whether framing matters in a direct,
unmediated fashion. It is more plausible to expect an interactive relationship
between the effective use of discourse and the broader partisan, cultural and
institutional context within which meanings are embedded. Given a conducive
set of circumstances, the framing effort may help summon support (or dampen
opposition) for an issue that might otherwise fail to assemble the necessary
coalition of adherents. Below, I consider four variables that condition leaders’
opportunities for framing social policy. I conceive of these as necessary not
sufficient conditions for successful framing. Together these parameters provide
a preliminary model or ideal type against which empirical opportunities for
framing welfare reform may be evaluated.
Extant Frames
As intimated earlier, framing is a misnomer. New issues excepted, framing
involves  reframing. This is not a mere quibble over terminology. Rather, it
reflects a flaw in the standard conceptualisation of the cognitive framing
process; namely, the failure to account for the influence of extant frames. Not
only are the public often assumed to be a trifle gullible, they are also portrayed
as empty vessels.
As cognitive misers, humans already have an elaborate constellation of
cognitive short cuts that serve as barriers to new information. The assumption
that elites can override long-standing referents such as partisan identification orRSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 7
deep-seated values regarding what constitutes just and equitable policy
underestimates humans' loyalty and dependence upon prevailing cognitive
tools. As powerful defensive mechanisms, standing frames insulate the welfare
state against reframing initiatives. Especially important in this regard are what
Rein and  Schon (1994) refer to as “ metacultural” frames. Symbols and
meanings are communicated at different “levels of abstractness”. Metacultural
frames are cultural  predispositions founded upon common norms and values.
Cultural differences in attachments to values of efficiency and equity, rights
and responsibilities produce identifiable patterns of welfare discourse.
Nested within metacultural frames are “institutional action frames” (Rein
and Schon, 1994). These are the policy-specific frames that decision makers
use when appraising, selecting and packaging policy alternatives. While actors
are more likely to re-evaluate policy frames than cultural predispositions, both
frames serve to lock-in prevailing welfare values and bind the range of
acceptable policy options. To muster support, therefore, new frames must
respond to those already operative. This is not to imply that societies are
culturally homogenous, but rather that historical patterns of welfare state
involvement have produced distinct welfare configurations with identifiable
value patterns (see Esping-Andersen, 1990). Liberal welfare regimes, with their
stronger emphasis on values of residualism, individual responsibility and means-
testing, are most conducive to reframing welfare retrenchment. In extreme
cases such as the United States, extant frames are comparatively retrenchment-
friendly.
Actors
The framing literature does not differentiate between partisan actors in their
capacity to frame. For the most part, anyone who can command an audience
can, in principle, frame with some success. It is not implausible to suggest,
however, an interactive framing effect between partisan actors and issues, with
the left commanding greater authority to frame on welfare than the right. This,
of course, helps explain one of the processes by which partisan issue-
associations take effect and why crafting a new consensus on the welfare state
may be heavily dependent upon leftist parties (author, 1997, 1999; Green-
Pedersen, 1998).
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Druckman (1998) contends that successful framing depends on two
issues relating to the credibility of the source. The first pertains to the source's
knowledge of the subject matter. There is little reason to expect this criterion to
discriminate between parties of the left and right, although it is possible that
because the public perceives the left to care more about alleviating poverty,RSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 8
they may believe them to be more knowledgeable about welfare. The second
criterion for successful framing relates to the trustworthiness of the speaker.
This would seem to be the critical factor affecting the public’s response to
welfare restructuring efforts by the left and right. Very simply, voters do not
trust rightist parties to reform the welfare state whereas they assume that social
democratic parties will engage in genuine reform rather than indiscriminate and
harsh retrenchment.
There is a second important issue relating to the actors involved in the
framing exercise. Framing necessitates transmitting ideas about groups, e.g. the
‘type’ of people associated with the issue. For example, those reliant on non-
contributory, means-tested benefits are a comparatively easy target for negative
framing. These groups are often predominantly women and immigrants. In
many places, the rhetoric of welfare restructuring has assumed explicitly
nationalist, racist and sexist overtones. While this discourse cross-cuts regimes,
it is considerably easier to frame in these terms where programs are heavily
means-tested and where the normative role of the state corresponds to the
liberal idea than where it embraces social equality or even state paternalism.
 
Institutions
Parties are not free-floating actors who can roam the ideological spectrum with
instrumentality and frame with liberty. They operate within a set of institutional
rules and norms that provide varied incentives and possibilities for framing.
Leaders must command the institutional authority as well as the credibility
(based on trust) to frame. A key issue in this respect is the presence of a
credible source of counter-framing. The multiparty systems of continental
Europe with significant “far” left parties or where social partners play an
integral role in the policy process retain higher degrees of frame-conflict, in
turn, lessening the impact of reframing initiatives. In the case of minority (often
coalition) governments, characteristic of the Nordic countries, leaders’ reliance
upon a broad-based cross-party parliamentary (and extra-parliamentary)
consensus precludes significant reframing. Consensus-building strategies may
depoliticise a modest cost-cutting program, yet almost by definition they rely
upon framing issues around the status quo. Not surprisingly, the two-party
systems of the English-speaking countries have reframed social policy far more
significantly than their counterparts on the left or right elsewhere.
While two-party competition has served to reduce frame-conflict, some
types of institutional  power-sharing can facilitate  reframing. The
“decentralised” federal structure of the United States has provided national and
sub-national leaders with a number of possibilities.
4 First, reframing welfare inRSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 9
terms of state autonomy serves to eclipse the principle of national standards.
Second, institutional  power-sharing between levels of government has proved
to be a highly interactive process, not simply a devolutionary one. Key states
have effectively propelled their welfare frames onto the national agenda. The
Southern states have been particularly successful in both hampering the




Policies are located in combinations of political arena, each with a different
constellation of interests attached to them. To change the reach of welfare
provision, leaders may shift services to the private sector, devolve them to non-
national governments or other state and semi-state bodies, or dismantle them
(Staeheli et al, 1997;  Kodras, 1997). Each mode of restructuring involves
recasting the political advantages and disadvantages associated with old and
new policy arena. Dismantling, for example, demands that either the family or
voluntary sector be framed as the optimal location for the execution of
traditional welfare functions.  Privatization requires that leaders frame the
market as the most effective realm for the provision of services. Devolution
demands that non-national governments are framed as best able to formulate
and administer social policy. A government’s capacity to adopt each strategy,
of course, is partially conditioned by existing institutional and policy
arrangements, and, as alluded to earlier, countries differ in their normative
attachments to different policy arena. Framing the market as the optimal policy
location, for example, is less arduous where private provision is already well
established. Devolution is facilitated by a  decentralized federal structure.
Likewise, diversity in  programmatic structure eases shifting the balance
between arenas in a way that universalism resists.
These four variables provide a preliminary framework for  analyzing
leaders’ reframing capabilities whilst exploring broad departures in welfare
frames across affluent societies. The optimal conditions for reframing welfare
are found in the United States where cultural and programmatic attachments to
welfare  residualism, individual responsibility and  means-testing are already
well-established, and the two-party system is combined with a decentralized
mode of federalism. In the United States the market already enjoys a much
elevated status in society and, as noted, a bi-partisan consensus has legitimated
retrenchment and marginalised voices of dissent, especially since the mid-
1990s. I return to explore the American case in section four. To provide a
comparative context for this discussion, I first identify four dominant types of
welfare frames.RSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 10
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Framing Reform Across “Worlds of Welfare”
Welfare frames across welfare regimes cluster into four dominant groups:
endogenous-inherent, exogenous-systemic, exogenous-defensive and
exogenous-anticipatory. Table 1 illustrates how amenable extant frames, actors,
institutions and arena are to reframing welfare in each group. The table is
designed to isolate important differences in welfare frames across regimes, not
capture the detail of any one system. Despite the burst of scholarly works
decrying the globalisation thesis, most leaders have resorted to exogenous
frames, stressing the inevitably of reform under the constraints of economic
competition. Yet they have done so in different ways, signaling quite different
reform agenda.
Exogenous-Systemic Frames
Exogenous-systemic frames are predominately found in the social democratic
welfare regimes of the Nordic countries. According to this line of argument,
exogenous shifts have resulted in a range of economic tensions (retarded
growth, debilitating expenditure levels, unemployment, deficits, heightened
competition) that preclude further expansion of the welfare state. These new
economic challenges demand modest cutbacks in selective areas, whilst
growing imbalances in the welfare system require some redistribution; increased
affluence has alleviated the plight of traditional welfare clients while the new
poor now find themselves without adequate coverage (Ploug, 1994). Thus, the
reform process is driven by a combination of exogenously-induced economic
tensions and, more minor internal (systemic) flaws. The latter, of course,
favour benefit increases (not simply cuts) where feasible e.g. in the stronger
performing economies of Norway and Denmark (see Eitrheim and  Kuhnle,
1999;  Lodemel, 1994:62). The pure retrenchments that have occurred (for
example, in replacement rates for sickness insurance), are largely confined to
Finland and Sweden—the two Nordic cases which have suffered the most
severe economic stress (Eitrheim and Kuhnle, 1999:4, 7-8).
Metacultural frames in these cases, emphasizing the state’s obligation for
public welfare, have insulated the welfare state against an infusion of market-
liberal ideas. Despite the unique challenges that Finland has confronted, where
shifts in the international system have brought unusually harsh economic
pressures, public opinion remains firmly supportive of the state as the principal
welfare provider (Ploug, 1994:16). In Sweden the backlash against social policy
cuts led the research director of Sifo polling to declare during the 1998 general
election; “Talking about tax cuts in this campaign is like swearing in church”.
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Even minor parties on the far right have resorted to what Eitrheim and Kuhnle
(1999:9) term “a strong welfare populism”.
With policy frames emphasizing universal and comprehensive coverage
and social rights attached to residence there are few programmatic cleavages
along which “deserving” recipients may be separated from “undeserving” ones
(Eitrheim and Kuhnle, 1999:1). Indeed, these regimes are notable for negating a
new moralization of welfare--something that would be starkly at odds with
prevailing conceptions of equality not to mention dominant family patterns.
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With respect to the framing powers of political actors, perhaps most
interesting in the Nordic cases has been the cross-party convergence in welfare
frames, especially evident in countries that have suffered the worse economic
challenges (Eitrheim and Kuhnle, 1999:8-9). This has resulted in a distinct lack
of frame-conflict, but in a direction that has locked-in existing welfare paths.
Part of the explanation for this depoliticisation is the effect that economic
stress places upon traditional party politics and part appears to be explicable in
terms of the Nordic countries institutional proclivity towards minority
government ( Eitrheim and  Kuhnle, 1999:26).  Depoliticisation of welfare
discourse is essential for aggregating parliamentary (and extra-parliamentary)
support behind minor retrenchments. To craft such broad coalitions, leaders
must appeal to prevailing frames. Indeed, the strategic dependence of minority
governments on  intra and extra-parliamentary coalitions largely precludes
significant reframing from the left or right. This institutional vulnerability, of
course, also tends to deprive the left of the benefits that might be reaped from
partisan issue-associations. Moreover, the possibility of voter-flight in even
relatively centripetal multiparty systems has discouraged the major parties from
adopting a more market-oriented rhetoric of reform.
The less extensive use and weak normative attachment to the market in
the Nordic world have protected the welfare state against privatizing initiatives.
This is not to imply that the relationship between arena has remained constant
and, while still peripheral, the private sector has become increasingly visible in
welfare provision. As indicated in table 1, a form of “state-based pluralism” has
emerged, signaling greater use of the market but in a manner that is heavily
circumscribed by a dominant state. Some parties on the center-right of the
ideological spectrum have emphasized a greater role for the family in social
welfare provision. However, these new responsibilities are envisioned to be
firmly embedded within a state financed welfare system (see Eitrheim and
Kuhnle, 1999:10; Palme, 1994:42).RSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 13
An overall evaluation of exogenous-systemic frames illustrates the very
weak opportunities leaders on either side of the political spectrum enjoy for
reframing the programs and principles of the Nordic welfare state.
Exogenous-Defensive Frames
Exogenous-defensive frames, characteristic of the continental European
countries with strong leftist parties and powerful trade unions, seek to protect
deeply entrenched welfare institutions to the greatest extent that exogenous
imperatives will permit. Despite compelling pressures for modernisation in
terms of policy coverage and the paternalistic values embedded within existing
programs, these catholic-conservative regimes have framed comparatively
modest reforms (especially in social security) in terms of maintaining existing
programs (see Chabonnel, 1994:121). Exogenous pressures are deemed to be
real in the sense of immediate budgetary and fiscal tensions, but not so
crucifying that all manner of social protection must be eroded in anticipation of
further global competition (see Esping-Andersen, 1996).
The combination of a multiparty system with significant far left parties
and strong trade unions has played a critical role in defining the defensive tenor
of this discourse. While Levy (1999) notes the objective possibilities for the left
adopting a “vice into virtue” reform strategy in these cases, whereby social
democratic governments can implement much needed progressive reform by
emphasising the system’s inequalities and exclusions, powerful interests tied to
the status quo discourage such a strategy. Fractious labour movements continue
to ensure that traditional leftist frames remain the basic reference point in any
reform dialogue. More than left-right partisan conflict, antagonism between the
parties and the trade unions, especially in France, keeps the welfare debate
solidly grounded in a discourse of social rights.
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For this reason, issue-associations offer parties of the left very modest
padding, although rightist parties have proved more vulnerable in their reform
initiatives. Even limited reframing attempts by the right have brought a sweep
of leftist parties to power across continental Europe. Moreover, with benefits
founded on the principle of status maintenance, isolating deserving recipients
from undeserving ones does not naturally divide along programmatic lines.
Indeed, exogenous-defensive frames have displayed relatively little victimisation
of welfare dependants as being fraud-prone or lazy--although second-tier social
assistance recipients have, as elsewhere, fared comparatively worse.RSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 14
Extant frames and policy arena are likewise hostile to  reframing
initiatives. Standing conceptions of justice favour a system of status
maintenance and state paternalism guards against benefit  residualisation.
Indeed, the heavy role for the state (and the family as supported through state
institutions) casts scepticism over privatised provision. Actors on both the left
and right have decried what Prodi has called “sadist liberalism” (Magara, 1997:
11).
Although the most severe tensions afflict the conservative regimes of
continental Europe where a combination of onerous payroll taxes, a heavy,
skewed pension burden, high unemployment, low birth rates, and the exclusion
of women from the labour market place immense stresses upon social
programs, exogenous-defensive frames do not signal a major overhaul of the
continental welfare state in the near future.
Exogenous-Anticipatory Frames
Exogenous anticipatory frames, trumpeted by the English-speaking left (outside
the USA), reflect the logic of structural dependency theses and embrace reform
on the premise of its inevitability (Hay and Watson, 1997;  Wickham-Jones,
1999). Changed global conditions require new welfare institutions, infused with
new values to meet future global challenges. The successful countries of the
next millennium will be those that have anticipated the inevitable and gained the
competitive edge.
While the principal diagnosis of the welfare dilemma centres on
economic requisites, these adjustments are framed as fundamentally dependent
upon new social values and changed labour market obligations. Indeed,
exogenous-anticipatory frames seek to radically shift the post-war welfare
balance away from social rights and towards obligations. Inherent to such
reframing initiatives is the implication that a rights-based welfare system breeds
a culture of dependency. Not unlike its conservative counterpart, this frame
discloses a strong  moralism. Commenting on Britain’s New Labour, Roy
Hattersley lamented, “For all its  slickness there is a chilling Old Testament
quality about New Labour. The industrious are to be rewarded and the indolent
to be punished”.
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Particularly interesting here is the extent to which leftist parties have had
to reframe  their social and economic values. In the case of Britain’s New
Labour, for example, the party has gone to great lengths to renounce class
politics and replace its traditional commitment to social and economic equality
with a  depoliticised discourse of economic and social pragmatism. ToRSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 15
disassociate itself from its socialist past, New Labour has issued proclamations
such as “no return to past failures” and “the function of modern government is
not to second-guess the market” (cited in Hay and Watson, 1997:14).
Reviewing  Blair’s transformation,  Seyd (1997: 49) reports, ‘in his leaders
speech to the 1995 Labour Party Conference, Tony Blair used the word new
on fifty-nine occasions, 16 of them with reference to “New Labour”. In
contrast, he referred to socialism just once and to the working class not at all.’
The left’s success in  reframing its welfare agenda with considerable
rapidity owes much to the interaction of the two-party system, crippled labour
movements and favourable issue-associations. The two-party system and
disempowered unions have removed a significant source of counter-framing
from actors further to the left. In the absence of counter-frames protecting
existing welfare values, issue associations have offered the left considerable
cushioning. The unusual popularity of New Labour, despite pursuing
remarkably similar initiatives to those tabled by previous Tory governments, is
testimony to the authority the party can command on social policy reform.
Extant cultural and policy frames have also contributed to the relative
success of exogenous-anticipatory frames. While cultural attachments to the
welfare state are much more deeply embedded in liberal regimes outside the
United States and policy structures are less exclusionary than in America, the
principle and practice of targeting are well-established.  Means-testing and
residualism have eased the burden of framing welfare dependants as
undeserving. Indeed, a discourse centred on labour market obligations by
definition defines claimants as socially irresponsible.
The underlying pluralism of extant policy structures in the English-
speaking world has assisted reframing initiatives in a way that universalism and
status maintenance systems impede. Their historical attachment to classical
liberal values has encouraged an acceptance of neo-liberal precepts that is
lacking in social democratic and conservative regimes. Blending nineteenth and
twentieth century welfare values, exogenous-anticipatory frames promote a
form of market-based pluralism with the state retaining welfare functions in key
areas. It is worth noting that its emphasis on labour market obligations for
women as well as men discourages a system of family-based welfare provision.
Despite the fact that liberal regimes have confronted the least severe
economic tensions, exogenous-anticipatory frames promulgated by the political
left in these countries have reframed the values and institutions of the welfare
state in significant ways.RSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 16
Endogenous-Inherent Frames
Only one of the four frames identified here primarily draws on endogenous
arguments. Endogenous-inherent frames are well established in the United
States and, over the last decade and a half, have been deployed by rightist
parties across liberal regimes. The thrust of this rhetoric is that elaborate
welfare systems are inherently misguided and, far from ameliorating poverty,
they are apt to induce social ills by rewarding indolence and discouraging
individual responsibility. In  Cope’s (1997:190) words, “The underlying
message is that that the causes of poverty lie with the individual--not with
economic shifts, exploitation, race or gender discrimination, disinvestment in
education and social supports, or a lack of available jobs”. Framed in such
individualistic terms, welfare recipients must have their labour market
responsibilities thrust upon them. In Peter  Lilley’s infamous terms, the
government must “close down the something for nothing society”.
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This frame blends individualism and social morality with a logic of
economic obligation ( Staeheli, 1997). State welfare functions should be
severely residualised, allowing a much greater role for private provision and
charitable giving through the local community. Devolving functions to the
family, of course, is less desirable simply because curtailing women’s
employment possibilities destabilises the labour market.
As noted above, extant frames in the English-speaking world tend to be
more conducive to welfare restructuring than where values of equality of
outcome or state paternalism are embedded. While the welfare state remains a
popular set of institutions outside the United States,  means-testing and
residualism are well entrenched, facilitating further division between recipients.
Though not enjoying the elevated status found in America, a basic acceptance
of market-based provision in most liberal regimes also frees leaders from
significantly reframing policy arena.
Reframing welfare in endogenous-inherent terms has certainly been aided
by the two-party system and enfeebled trade union movements of the English-
speaking world, both of which have reduced counter-framing from the far-left.
The  decentralized federal system of the United States has also facilitated
reframing welfare in the language of devolution, state-power and local
autonomy---traditional values with a deep normative appeal among the
American public.
Outside the United States, where metacultural and policy frames remain
less amenable to retrenchment, issue-associations have had a constrainingRSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 17
impact on the right and its harsh vilification of welfare recipients has invited
backlash. This was evident during the Tories eighteen year reign in Britain. The
Conservatives’ fiery oratorical assault on the welfare state, combined with their
institutional dominance, left the British public with a deep fear that their
popular welfare services would be residualised at best or dismantled at worst.
King (1997:192-3) recalls how the Conservatives “suffered from the near-
universal belief among the electorate that, under the Tories, basic public
services [...] had suffered, were suffering and would continue to suffer”.
Thatcher’s successor, John Major, deliberately tempered his approach towards
the welfare state on the explicit understanding that his party was particularly
vulnerable on social policy--a moderation that did little to allay public unease.
While the most conducive parameters for reframing welfare are found in
the liberal regimes of the English-speaking world, only in America are extant
frames, institutions, actors and policy arena all conducive to reframing welfare
in ways that can render retrenchment broadly popular.
Optimal Conditions for Framing Retrenchment: The USA 
The 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) represents one of the most dramatic breaks in welfare provision in
the recent history of the United States. Far from following a path-dependent
pattern of change, the PRWORA illustrates how ideas have triumphed over
institutions in the welfare restructuring process (see King, 1999). The Act
dismantled Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), America’s main
federal cash entitlement program, replacing it with the block grant Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families (TANF).
11 Though the PRWORA predominately
reflected the Republican’s welfare agenda, it passed with bi-partisan support in
the House and Senate. And, though President Clinton twice vetoed earlier
versions, he declared the third compromised measure, “ending welfare as we
know it”, to be largely consistent with his own agenda.
The  PRWORAs complete retrenchment of AFDC was enabled by a
highly successful framing initiative undertaken by the Republicans during their
1994 Congressional campaign and aggressively continued by speaker Gingrich
after the party gained control of both Houses of Congress for the first time in
forty years. The Democrats’ shock at losing both the House and Senate in
1994, combined with their preparations for the 1996 elections, led the President
to dramatically lurch to the right on welfare reform, collaborating in the highly
punitive discourse of welfare dependency. Despite the excuses some
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welfare agenda owing to the burdens of health care reform, the Republicans’
electoral success in 1994 sent the President an unambiguous signal that there
were electoral benefits to be reaped in embracing a conservative vision.
Though AFDC never enjoyed the popularity of many European welfare
programs, growing increasingly controversial in recent years, Cope (1997:183)
correctly argues that it remains “politically difficult to simply do away with
systems of benefits and long-standing entitlements for poor mothers and their
children”. The fact that the PRWORA acquired the support it did speaks to the
success of the framing process.  For sure, the American welfare state has
always been considerably more minimalist than its counterparts in other liberal
regimes, its programs more residualist and less deeply entrenched, and it has
always sat uncomfortably alongside the basic values of a country whose
political culture is characterised by a deep scepticism of government. While
keenly relevant to our understanding of how a discourse of economic, social
and moral obligation enjoyed such receptivity in the US, neither the modest
popular support AFDC enjoyed nor its institutional fragility can alone explain
why by 1996 diverse segments of American society, including the American
poor, became convinced that AFDC was responsible for their plight (Staeheli et
al, 1997; Lake, 1997).
A forcefully espoused rhetoric of excessive welfare rights, eroded
responsibilities, fraud and sloth successfully united discontented sections of
American society (Staeheli et al 1997). For too long, it was argued, welfare
recipients have been protected by a discourse and policy of social rights, freeing
them to take from their communities without obligation or return. Hand-outs
have encouraged anti-family practices, including illegitimacy, and robbed
localities of the charitable function that integrates communities. Not only has
AFDC fostered un-American values, it has done so on the back of the working
American family.
Deploying a set of frames that located a range of social, economic and
moral problems in the personal behaviour of welfare recipients, state and
national leaders pieced together an unlikely amalgam of groups who,
experiencing a flush of economic anxiety, were willing to direct their
disaffection towards government (Staeheli et al, 1997; Lake, 1997). At the core
of this temporary alliance were “Reagan Democrats”, the white working poor
who felt especially hard-hit (in expectations if not real income) by a slowing
economy (Lake, 1997). Leaders linked the anxieties of these volatile voters to
the concerns of the lower middle classes and business through a discourse that
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federal government that squeezed working families, stifled fair competition with
a plethora of regulation and rewarded idleness (Lake, 1997).
Drawing on the four parameters for successful framing discussed above,
I now examine why this framing initiative proved so effective.
Extant frames
Though losing the battle over constitutional ratification in 1789, many of the
core concerns of the anti-federalists remain deeply rooted within the American
value system. Recurrent fears of a remote federal government, impervious to
the concerns of the common people, intensify during times of stress. Staeheli
(1997:60) observes how “the anxiety created by economic and social
restructuring has created a climate in which citizens return to long-standing
debates over the nature of the Republic and the role of citizenship and
community in self-government”.
Metacultural frames in the United States are unusually receptive to
retrenchment. The American public has never welcomed welfare programs
with the same enthusiasm as their European counterparts and heavy social
spending has rarely served the legitimating function that it has routinely
assumed in other affluent societies. More than cultural stereotypes, the values
of individual responsibility and economic individualism are deeply embedded
within the American value system. A recent survey conducted by the
Washington Post, the Kaiser Foundation and Harvard University revealed that
Americans’ prefer ‘“smaller government with few services” by nearly two to
one over a larger government providing more services.’
12 With respect to
economic liberalism the survey reported, ‘seven in 10 agreed that people who
don’t succeed in life “have only themselves to blame”’.
13
These sentiments intensify during times of stress. In the year leading up
to the PRWORA, an earlier survey by the Washington Post, Kaiser Foundation
and Harvard University revealed that; “America is becoming a nation of
suspicious strangers, and this mistrust of each other is a major reason
Americans have lost confidence in the federal government and virtually every
other major national institution”.
14 Why these anti-government sentiments were
explicitly directed towards AFDC recipients becomes more apparent when they
are disaggregated: ‘nearly two in three Americans believe that most can’t be
trusted [...].Half say most people would cheat others if they had the chance,
and an equal proportion agree that “most people are looking out for
themselves”’.
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It is hardly surprising, therefore,  that diverse sections of the public
proved so receptive to a discourse emphasising the personal failings of welfare
claimants. Citizens classed as “economically anxious”, who constituted over
one third of all Americans in the months leading up the PRWORA’s enactment,
were particularly prone to these sentiments.
16 Indeed, rather than increasing
public support for more vulnerable members of society, worsening economic
anxieties would seem to have the opposite effect. That these anxieties directly
flowed from economic shifts yet were widely attributed to an over-active
government and irresponsible under-class says much about America’s cultural
attachment to the market (Staeheli et al, 1997).
Despite these sentiments, leaders still had to aggregate a coalition out of
materially antagonistic interests in order to retrench AFDC. One reason why
they were able to do so under conditions of divided government is due to the
value cleavages that cut across party lines. Detecting five distinct clusters of
Democrats and four clusters of Republicans, a recent survey found that
“libertarian Democrats” (9 % of all democrats) actually favour cutting welfare
benefits after five years, as do 6 out of 10 “New Generation Democrats” (15 %
of all democrats). Even “determined liberal Democrats” (30% of all democrats)
show an ambivalence towards government, favouring bigger government but
fearful of federal inefficiencies and intrusions, whilst poor “discouraged
Democrats” (19 % of all Democrats) have no expectations that the government
should rectify their plight with  hand-outs. Indeed, only “helping hand
Democrats” (22% of all Democrats) embrace both a larger federal government
and the extension of welfare benefits beyond a five year period.
17
The survey also revealed, however, that “liberal Republicans” (19% of
all Republicans) actually favour further government services and about 2 in 3
of all “Big Government Conservatives” (23% of all Republicans) report that
‘“government should do everything possible to improve the standard of living
of all Americans”.’ The majority of “Big Government Conservatives” oppose
terminating welfare benefits after 5 years.
18 It is these cross-cutting cleavages
that allowed leaders to fuse competing material interests behind a retrenchment
agenda.
Policy frames in the United States were also congenial to retrenchment
initiatives. Long described as a welfare “laggard”, American social policy never
matured to the same extent as its European counterparts. When other welfare
states were expanding and entrenching during the second half of the 1960s,
access to benefits was being incrementally eroded in the United States. The
passage of the Work Incentives Program in 1967 signalled that women without
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the time Reagan signed the Family Support Act in 1988 workfare was already
established in principle and the FSA significantly broadened its application. The
Bush administration granted a comparatively small number of federal waivers,
allowing the states to innovate with their own welfare arrangements--a practice
massively extended by President Clinton. Indeed, by granting waivers so freely,
Clinton collaborated in undercutting the very principle of a federal entitlement.
In sum, both metacultural and policy frames supported retrenchment.
Americans are apt to blame government in times of hardship rather than turn to
it for help. As a non-contributory program, AFDC attracted limited support and
the concept of workfare was already institutionally embedded.
 Actors and Institutions
The success of framing welfare retrenchment in the United States was in many
respects the result of a distinct partisan and institutional power-sharing
dynamic. Consequently, it makes most sense to examine the second and third
framing parameter together. Both the Republicans and the Democrats
introduced welfare reform bills seeking to terminate AFDC in 1995. The
Democrats softened theirs with a number of provisions, including child care for
mothers moving off welfare and into work, and the cost of the two bills
differed to the tune of $41 billion.
19 The cost differentials, however, were a
function of Republican cuts in food stamps and support for legal immigrants,
not AFDC’s retrenchment. Clinton himself argued that these differences were
of peripheral importance to the  PRWORA’s principal aim and, as
Congressional  Quarterly reported, “Clinton never insisted that an individual’s
entitlement to Aid to Families with Dependent Children [...] be retained”.
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The climate of retrenchment, in other words, cannot be reduced to
Republican rhetoric alone. The Republican version of welfare reform came to
dominate owing to the tardiness of the Clinton administration in presenting its
plan before July 1994. However, a clear bi-partisan consensus had already
developed on the fundamental principle of dismantling AFDC.
After the Republican victories in the 1994 Congressional elections, much
of the drive for reform flowed from the legislature. The Democratic President,
however, assumed a critical role in dismantling AFDC. First, it is questionable
whether a Republican president could have condoned such a harsh measure
without incurring a major electoral risk. Note how Dole lost two traditionally
Republican states, Florida and Arizona, in the 1996 election due to fears of
pension and Medicare reform.  While these two programmes have always
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perception of the Republicans as hostile to any social spending, coupled with
the rhetorical severity of a purely conservative approach, seems likely to have
incited public concerns that AFDC was the beginning of a ‘slippery slope’ in
social spending. The public reaction against the extremity of the 104th
Congress at the 1996 elections returned a much reduced Republican majority
promising to be altogether more moderate.
Likewise, a united Republican administration risked inviting far more
ferocious criticism from Congressional Democrats than emerged under
conditions of divided government. Voices of dissent were noticeably quietened
as social liberals tempered their opposition to the President. Indeed, Clinton’s
‘big spending liberal’ image and compensatory policies (anointing social security
with cabinet status, raising the minimum wage, increasing the flexibility of
health insurance, the earned income tax credit, the Family and Medical Leave
Act) helped excuse his collusion in retrenching AFDC among social liberals.
A critical component of institutional and partisan power-sharing in the
United States that is absent from most European style coalitions is that it occurs
within  the context of the two-party system. Under conditions of divided
government, therefore, power is split between the centre-left and centre-right,
providing few opportunities for significant counter-framing. The American
parties in the modern era have never splintered on fundamentals in the way
their European counterparts have. And, while no longer ‘ tweedledum and
tweedledee’, both the Republicans and the Democrats share the same broad
policy frames. Much of the argument between the parties on welfare reform
focused on policy details (albeit important details for those effected), not the
principle of whether ‘big government’ in general and AFDC in particular must
be dismantled.
A further component of America’s mode of institutional power-sharing is
its decentralised federal structure. Intimately associated with the virtues of
small government,  a rhetoric of state rights enjoys periodic renewal in
American politics, most recently with  Reagan’s New Federalism.  Reagan
imparted a rhetorical and programmatic legacy that glorified the dissolution of
national standards and celebrated geographical disparities in the name of state
autonomy, civic virtue and efficiency. In retrenching AFDC, both Republicans
and Democrats trumpeted these themes, omitting any serious discussion of the
very obvious pitfalls of dismantling the federal entitlement. Framing
retrenchment in the language of localism gathered further momentum once
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American institutions, of course, are typically prohibitive of major policy
change. The separation of powers, checks and balances, decentralised federal
structure, as well as the partisan proclivity for divided government present veto
players with multiple access points. However, not all veto players are equal. It
would be usual to expect some asymmetry in the importance of interests in
relation to specific policy problems. When welfare retrenchment was on the
agenda the most powerful activists proved to be supporters of retrenchment
frames. Confronting new competitive pressures from an increasingly
internationalised marketplace, American business assumed a critical role in
framing economic anxieties as a direct consequence of welfare policies that
escalated the labour costs and eroded the competitiveness of American firms.
These material interests were legitimated by anointed ‘experts’ and
conservative think tanks who mustered scientific evidence in support of their
arguments (see King, 1999).
21
Federalism does provide a legal basis for state complaint against the
national government, presenting possibilities for policy overturn. Access points
are not only relevant during the pre-enactment period. Veto players are often
most effective after the fact--when the consequences of painful measures
become clear and when concerned parties have had an opportunity to mobilise.
In the case of the PRWORA, several states initiated law suits against the
federal government immediately following its enactment. In less than a year,
Florida had filed a suit claiming that the PRWORA placed a crippling financial
burden on the state (in excess of $1 billion per annum) owing to its large
number of legal immigrants.
The legal challenges mounted by isolated states, however, have
concerned specific policy details, not the overriding principle of reform. With
AFDC dismantled, opponents of the PRWORA had few political possibilities
for aggregating a national response. This is not to imply that states cannot
frame initiatives on their own terms. The success of the southern states in
curbing social policy expansion and forcing their interpretation of welfare
dependency onto the national agenda are well documented (King, 1996). The
political cohesion of the now solidly Republican southern states and their
institutional ascendancy within Congress enabled them to take the lead in
framing retrenchment.
Lacking these attributes, however, most states cannot hope to have this
impact. Indeed, most states have simply perpetuated Southern frames. Despite
the celebration of local diversity, state policymakers have sustained a discourse
of dependency based on “deeply  aspatial assumptions” (Cope, 1997:186).
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programs is a logic of individual responsibility, regardless of whether claimants
reside in an urban metropolis or rural outpost, in the north-east or in the south-
west. Cope (1997:204) makes note of this fact by pointing to the title of state
initiatives, such as Colorado’s “Personal Responsibility Project”, Missouri’s
“Families Mutual Responsibility Plan” and Georgia’s “Personal Accountability
and Responsibility Project”.
Aided by severe  means-testing and a legacy of divisive AFDC
stereotypes, victimisation of welfare claimants has come easily in the United
States. In part, these stereotypes are perpetuated by policymakers’ failure to
hear directly from politically  marginalised claimants, allowing the welfare
debate to assume “an exaggerated ideological form” (King, 1999:272).
Americans’ receptivity to these simplistic arguments, however, may also have
something to do with their high levels of political ignorance.
22 The unusually
explicit racism plaguing welfare in America is well documented ( Quadagno,
1994). Myths of the black ‘welfare queen’, so successfully propagated by the
Reagan administration, have played an integral part in framing workfare as a
necessary corrective to the un-American values held by minority communities.
In sum, on top of these divisive stereotypes, the success of retrenchment
frames also owe much to the lack of possibilities for counter-framing from the
left, the expanded opportunities provided by a system of decentralised
federalism, and the bi-partisan politics that emerged under conditions of divided
government to unite constituencies on the left and right.
Policy Arena
The rhetoric that sustained the PRWORA maligned big government, or more
accurately the federal government, while emphasising the merits of three
alternative policy arena: devolved state and local government, the market and
the charitable sector (see Staeheli  et al, 1997; Kodras, 1997). A discourse of
favouritism and unfairness framed each of these arena: robbed of their
constitutional and political authority by a gigantian federal government, the
states, and by extension the American people, had endured anxiety and
hardship; a welfare system that corrupted market principles, drove up labour
costs and thwarted US competitiveness had discriminated against American
business; American society at large bore the suffering a welfare system that
caused community breakdown by displacing social institutions, such as the
church, family and charitable sector, leading to a host of social ills, including
divorce, drugs, crime, illegitimacy and an inter-generational culture of
dependency (see Staeheli et al, 1997).RSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 25
The rhetoric linking these injustices was populist in orientation, returning
power to the people and acclaiming the virtues of self-determination.
Devolution would take government out of the hands of professional
Washington politicians. Removing barriers to the market and encouraging
private provision would encourage individual responsibility and
entrepreneurship. Reviving a role for charitable giving would allow localities to
assume responsibility for their own needs and integrate the socially excluded.
Far from being called into question, the importance of the market for
ensuring social and economic justice received further approbation (Staeheli et
al, 1997).  A rhetoric of exploitation or counter-frames challenging market
orthodoxy never surfaced. The fact that Americans, including poor Americans,
could readily accept that their economic anxieties derived from societal rather
than market changes, indicates, in  Staeheli’s (1997:xxviii) words, “the
porousness of the boundaries between capital and civil society and the ability of
politicians to discursively manipulate those boundaries”.
In sum, America’s deep normative attachment to the concept of the free
market, community and the role of charitable giving were discursively exploited
by national and sub-national leaders to renew hostility towards the federal
government and dignify a highly fragmented and residual form of workfare.
Conclusion
It is difficult to estimate the precise impact of political framing. While many
cognitive framing studies have tended to exaggerate its importance (Druckman,
1998), the role of political framing is well illustrated by the host of ‘spin
doctors’ and media personnel employed in the political arena (Campbell, 1998).
Politics is essentially about ideas, irrespective of whether these ideas are driven
by material interests. Ideas only matter to the extent they are successfully
diffused and capture the imagination of important sections of the voting public.
To do so they must be framed in a manner that is compelling. Whether or not
ideas can be framed in a convincing fashion, however, does not simply hinge
upon leaders’ framing abilities, but primarily on whether extant cultural and
policy frames, institutions, policy arena and an actor’s own issue-associations
are conducive.
I argued at the outset of this paper that the ‘new politics’ literature has
neglected the role political leadership can play in crafting welfare reform. Yet,
just as the reform process is not a ‘bottom-up’ one of public constraint, neither
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framing parameters considered here illustrate both top-down influences on the
welfare reform process and the limitations to elite control. Where cultural,
institutional and policy legacies are conducive to reframing welfare, political
leaders can hope to reframe social policy with some success, especially if they
enjoy public trust on the issue. Conversely, where these receptive conditions
fail to coalesce as neatly as they do in the United States, public opinion has
placed far greater constraints upon elites’ framing capabilities.
This analysis indicates that the power of political framing can be highly
variable, depending on at least the four parameters discussed above. It is clear,
however, that the discursive politics and symbolic elements of the reform
process are worthy of further attention. Extant frames, institutions, actors and
policy arena constitute necessary not sufficient conditions for successful
framing. Leaders deploy a variety of instruments in framing social policy that
warrant further consideration. Desmond King (1999), for example, has recently
illustrated the influential role expertise can play in legitimating social policy
reform.
With welfare reform gathering momentum since the mid-1990s, it is
evident that an overly static and institutionalised portrait of welfare
restructuring requires revision. To account for change more effectively, the
new politics needs to be infused with a source of political agency. The
dynamics driving restructuring cannot be reduced to exogenous pressures or
post-industrial transformations. To obtain political significance, objective trends
must be framed as both salient and pressing. A fruitful way forward, therefore,
may lie in probing the relationship not between exogenous and endogenous
imperatives, but between elite-driven agenda politics (whereby exogenous and
endogenous trends are framed as more or less pressing) and public-driven
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Notes
1 Esping-Andersen (1990) distinguishes between three types of welfare regimes: liberal
(characteristic of the English-speaking world), social democratic (associated with the Nordic
countries) and conservative (typical of continental Europe). While this division between “worlds
of welfare” has not escaped criticism, it continues to provide the principal typology for
differentiating between systems of social provision.
2 The social psychology literature on social movements has been most adept at integrating the
two uses of the concept (Gamson, 1992; Snow and Benford, 1992; Tarrow, 1992; Glenn, 1999).
3 The concept of partisan issue-associations reflects the logic of the 'Nixon goes to China' thesis:
leaders who are perceived to be closest to a politically delicate issue are likely to find themselves
most constrained. When unpopular policies are on the agenda, the latitude for leadership is largely
reserved for those who seem least likely to act, e.g. it took a vehement anti-Communist such as
Nixon to open diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1972. According to the
logic of the Nixon goes to China thesis, party issue-associations interact with policy problems to
limit and expand the scope for leadership. When issue-associations become a liability, the
possibilities for leadership grow increasingly slim.
4 Pierson (1995) draws a useful distinction between types of federal system. Rather than simply
implementing national mandates, decentralised federations enjoy considerable autonomy over
policy.
5 Veto points may only limit the scope of retrenchment where they encourage veto players to
mobilise on the left. Federalism does not exhibit any obvious relationship to the mobilisation of left-
wing interests and thus can enhance rather than weaken leaders’ retrenchment capabilities in the
manner described above. Two institutional factors appear to be responsible for the presence of
leftist veto players: the multiparty system and mechanisms for integrating trade union movements.
6 International Herald Tribune, September 21, 1998:6. See also  Palme, 1994;  Eitrheim and
Kuhnle, 1999.
7 New Right arguments regarding the negative behavioural effects of generous welfare benefits
have gained some currency in the Nordic world. As Plovsing (1994:31-2) observes in the Danish
case, the “active line” approach has been accompanied by 'slogans, such as “there is a need for
everyone”, “from passive to active” and “give and take”', indicating important shifts in the
ideology of social policy. Similar changes have been occurring in Norway, with a move away
from “passive” to “active” welfare (Lodemel, 1994:61 see also Ploug, 1994; Plovsing, 1994).
8 I am grateful to Bruno Palier for stressing the primacy of union-party conflict when I presented
an earlier version of this paper at the Robert Schuman Centre, European University Institute.
9 Roy Hattersley, “New Labour’s Program is Chilling and Draconian”, The Independent 18th
November 1999.
10 Peter Lilley, then social security secretary for the UK, made this announcement at the 1992
Conservative Party Conference. Cited in Sinfield, 1994:130.
11 Providing for limited exemptions, the PRWORA’s main conditions specify that any individual
can only receive welfare assistance for five years during their entire adult lifetime; within two
years of receiving welfare, claimants must work; participation in community service is mandatory
after two months of receiving benefits; no person between the ages of 18 and 50 (without
children) may receive food stamps for more than three months in a three year period; to qualify
for TANF funding, any parent under the age of 18 must live in an adult-supervised setting; states
may impose family cap policies on recipients; illegal immigrants and many post-PRWORA legal
immigrants cannot qualify for either TANF benefits or Medicaid.
12 Richard Morin and Claudia Deane, Patterns of Belief Fray Party Seams”, Washington Post,
Sunday October 4, 1998; Page A01. see //search.npost.com/wp-srv/Wplate/1998.RSC 2000/15 © 2000 Fiona Ross 28
13 Ibid.
14 R. Morin and D. Balz, “In America, Loss of Confidence Seeps into All Institutions”. The
Washington Post, Sunday January 28th, 1996.
15 Ibid.
16 The economically anxious are defined as “people who see the economy worsening, their own
financial future deteriorating and who doubt their children will fare better than they have”. Ibid.
17 Richard Morin and Claudia Deane, Patterns of Belief Fray Party Seams”, Washington Post,
Sunday October 4, 1998; Page A01. see <http://search.npost.com/wp-srv/Wplate/1998>.
18 Ibid.
19 “Changes in New Law Hinge on Budget Deal”, Congressional Quarterly, November 23 1996
p. 3311.
20 Ibid, p. 3310.
21 The social psychology literature on framing illustrates the role evidence can have on the
success of competing frames. See Tarrow, 1992; Snow and Benford, 1992.
22 R. Morin and D. Balz, “In America, Loss of Confidence Seeps into All Institutions”. The
Washington Post, Sunday January 28th, 1996. Reviewing the findings of one survey by the
Washington Post/Kaiser Foundation/Harvard University, the authors report, “The overwhelming
majority of those surveyed don’t know the names of their elected representatives, don’t know that
Robert J. Dole (R. Kan) is the Senate majority Leader, don’t know that the country spend more
on Medicare than it does on foreign aid. A third of all Americans [...] thinks that Congress has
already passed health care reform--or aren’t sure; four in 10 don’t know that the Republicans
control Congress; and half either think the Democratic Party is more conservative politically than
the GOP or don’t feel they know enough to offer a guess”.